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ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE RECENTLY PROPOSED
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We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We
make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiri-
tual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the
part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and
that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the
appeal of its dogma.1
INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, nineteen al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four passenger
airplanes with the intent to destroy American landmarks and inflict massive loss of
life.2 All nineteen terrorists were adherents of the Muslim faith and members of the
Islamist extremist group, al-Qaeda.3 In the aftermath of the attacks, popular evangelist
Franklin Graham referred to Islam as “a very evil and wicked religion.”4 Graham’s
comments were just the beginning of a slew of anti-Islamic sentiment in America fol-
lowing the 9/11 attacks.5 Hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims rose dramatically
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1 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
2 LORI PEEK, BEHIND THE BACKLASH: MUSLIM AMERICANS AFTER 9/11 at 18 (2011).
The 9/11 attacks killed 2,973 people (not including the hijackers). Nat’l Sept. 11 Mem’l &
Museum, FAQ About 9/11, 9/11 MEMORIAL, http://www.911memorial.org/faq-about-911
(last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
3 Nat’l Sept. 11 Mem’l & Museum, supra note 2; see also MICHAEL A. SMERCONISH,
FLYING BLIND 137 (2004).
4 PEEK, supra note 2, at 5.
5 Then Congressman, now Senator, Saxby Chambliss of Georgia commented in 2001 that
Georgia sheriffs should be able to arrest any Muslim that crossed state lines. Jason Vest, Exit
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in the wake of the attacks.6 Fear and hatred of Islam in the United States reached a
symbolic precipice when the mere belief that, then presidential candidate, Barack
Obama, was a “secret Muslim” threatened his viability as a candidate.7 The election
of President Obama spawned the birth of the Tea Party movement, a group of often
angry, sometimes rude, ultra-conservatives distrustful of the Obama administration
that has only contributed to the unusually scornful (even by American standards) mod-
ern political climate.8 In fact, former Republican presidential candidate and Speaker
of the House Newt Gingrich recently stated that he believes “[Islamic law] is a mortal
threat to the survival of freedom in the United States and in the world as we know it”
and that he would only support a Muslim-American Presidential candidate if he or she
renounced Islamic law.9 Former Senator and presidential candidate Rick Santorum
has made similar statements.10
Jesse, Enter Saxby, THE NATION (Nov. 10, 2002), http://www.thenation.com/article/exit-jesse
-enter-saxby. The day after the 9/11 attacks, a group of angry protestors marched on a pre-
dominantly Arab mosque in Chicago shouting “Kill the Arabs.” PEEK, supra note 2, at 29.
6 Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2011: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
295, 296 (2002).
7 See Jim Rutenberg, The Man Behind the Whispers About Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2008, at A1 (discussing the source of the theories concerning Obama’s religious heritage).
See also Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Obama and the Bigots, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at
WK13 (noting that “whispering campaigns allege that Mr. Obama is a secret Muslim planning
to impose Islamic law on the country.”). To this day, nearly one in five Americans believe
President Obama is a Muslim. Pew Research Center, Growing Number of Americans Say
Obama Is a Muslim, PEW F. ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (Aug. 18, 2010), http://pewforum.org
/Politics-and-Elections/Growing-Number-of-Americans-Say-Obama-is-a-Muslim.aspx.
8 See Peter Katel, Tea Party Movement: Will Angry Conservatives Reshape the Republican
Party?, 20 CONG. Q. RESEARCHER 241, 241, 243 (2010). Anti-Sharia sentiment has been
expressed at many Tea Party rallies. Matt Sedensky, Bids to Ban Foreign Laws Being Pushed
in 24 States, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 3, 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2012/03
/03/florida-mulls-outlawing-sharia-other-foreign-law/ho7VoVGal2rFySIl7N9MyN/story.html.
In response to the Council on American-Islamic Relations fight against the anti-Sharia Amend-
ment, one anonymous hate-mailer wrote to the Council, “[t]ake your Islamic laws, shove them
up your ass and go back to where you came from. You lice infested bastards are not welcome
and that goes[ ] for that Black Bastard that sits in the White House.” Leah Nelson, Oklahoma’s
Shariah Law Ban Creates Controversy, S. POVERTY L. CENTER (Spring 2011), http://www
.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2011/spring/oklahoma
-shariah-law-ban-creates-controversy. This type of blatant bigotry and racism has been all
too common in recent years.
9 Ashby Jones & Joe Palazzolo, States Target Foreign Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2012,
at A3; Scott Shane, In Islamic Law, Gingrich Sees a Mortal Threat to U.S., N.Y. Times,
Dec. 21, 2011, at A22.
10 Jones & Palazzolo, supra note 9. Just recently, an Illinois Congressman stated that rad-
ical Muslims are “trying to kill Americans every week.” Sabrina Siddiqui, Joe Walsh Meeting
with Muslims in Illinois After ‘Radical Islam’ Remarks, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/23/joe-walsh-muslims-radical-islam_n_1825815.html.
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Religious phobia is not a new phenomenon in America. Discrimination against
newcomers and their religious beliefs has been common throughout history.11 As
recently as the early twentieth century, the Catholic Church was considered a “foreign
menace” and dangerous to the United States.12 It was not until John F. Kennedy, a
Catholic, was elected President in 1960 that irrational fears were quelled about the
Pope taking over the nation if a Catholic were to become President.13 Catholics “went
from the ‘pilloried pariahs’ of mid-19th century America to the leaders of the nation
and its Supreme Court—150 years later.”14 Most recently, Republican presidential
candidate Mitt Romney has faced an increasing number of questions and concerns over
his Mormon faith, a religion “persecuted for much of the nineteenth century.”15 On the
Islam front, Muslim scholars fear that America is now suffering from Islamophobia—
an “unfounded and irrational fear of Islam as a religion and Muslims as a people.”16
Despite the fact that Muslims make up only 0.6% of the American population,17
fear of Islam has inspired multiple states to consider anti-Sharia (Islamic law) pro-
visions.18 While Sharia law has no specific definition, it is essentially Islamic law—an
11 See, e.g., Feisal Abdul Rauf, In This Election Year, Let There Be Tolerance, STAR
TRIB., Feb. 7, 2012, http://www.startribune.com/opinion/otherviews/138816299.html.
12 See, e.g., Eric Kniffin, Are American Muslims Entitled to the Same Free Exercise
Rights as Other Americans?, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (May 19, 2011), http://
www.becketfund.org/are-american-muslims-entitled-to-the-same-free-exercise-rights-as
-other-americans/.
13 See Rauf, supra note 11.
14 Mary J. Loftus, Advocates of Sharia Can Learn from Catholics and Jews, HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 6, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-j-loftus/sharia-advocates
-can-learn-from-catholics-and-jews_b_1249917.html.
15 Randall Balmer, Op-Ed., Why Mitt Romney Should Open Up on Mormonism, CBS
NEWS (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-215_162-57371934/why-mitt-romney
-should-open-up-on-mormonism/.
16 Abdullah Antepli, Islamophobia: America Becoming Europe, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 8,
2012, 10:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/imam-abdullah-antepli/islamophobia-america
-becoming-europe_b_1247167.html. In December 2011, bowing to conservative family orga-
nizations, national home improvement store, Lowe’s, pulled its advertisements from a TLC
reality television show called “All-American Muslim” that follows Muslim families in sub-
urban Michigan. Lowe’s Pulls Advertising from TLC’s ‘All-American Muslim,’ CNN (Dec. 12,
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/11/showbiz/all-american-muslim-lowes/index.html.
17 The World Factbook: United States, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia
.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
18 As of July 2012, more than twenty-four states had considered forty different measures
that would prevent state court judges from considering Sharia law. See Andrea Elliot, The
Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at A1; Sedensky, supra
note 8. Besides Oklahoma, Tennessee, Arizona, and Louisiana have also adopted laws banning
the consideration of Sharia and foreign law. Id. For a more detailed summary of anti-Sharia
proposals, see Intisar A. Rabb, The Islamic Rule of Lenity: Judicial Discretion and Legal
Canons, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1299, 1301–02 n.3 (2011). See also Jones & Palazzolo,
supra note 9. In May 2012, Kansas Governor Sam Brownback signed a bill into law pre-
venting state courts from considering or using international and Islamic law. Kevin Murphy,
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ever-evolving set of interpretations on how to practice the Islamic faith.19 While
Islam has many proponents who point out that Islam is a peace-loving religion,20 a
number of Americans only identify Islam with the smoldering ruins of the Twin
Towers, and view the religion as inherently violent and un-American, leading many
to support laws damaging to the Muslim community.21 Recognizing that laws spe-
cifically targeting Sharia are unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny, some anti-Muslim
proponents and state legislators have proposed laws that ban court consideration of
all religious law.22
On November 2, 2010, 70% of Oklahoma voters approved a measure, State
Question 755, also known as the “Save our State Amendment,” banning state courts
from considering or using Islamic Sharia law.23 If the “Save our State Amendment”
had gone into effect, Oklahoma Muslims would have faced difficulties in, among
other important areas of life, marrying, entering into business contracts, and exe-
cuting last wills and testaments in accordance with their religious principles.24
CAIR-OK serves as the primary opponent of State Question 755.25 Sadly, throughout
Kansas Governor, Sam Brownback, Signs Anti-Sharia Bill, Effectively Banning Islamic Law,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 26, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/25/kansas
-governor-signs-bil_n_1547145.html.
19 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Muneer Awad, Exec. Dir., Council on American-
Islamic Relations Oklahoma (Oct. 18, 2011) (interview notes on file with author) [hereinafter
Telephone Interview with Muneer Awad]; see also H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess.
(Okla. 2010) (describing Sharia as the law of Islam).
20 During his presidency, George W. Bush frequently noted that Islam is a peaceful and
loving religion. Just six days after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush spoke at the Islamic Center
of Washington D.C. where he stated, “[V]iolence against innocents violate[s] the fundamen-
tal tenets of the Islamic faith” and “Islam is peace.” Presidential Statement at the Islamic Center
of Washington, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 38 (Sept. 24, 2001).
21 Author Sam Harris believes that “[w]e are at war with Islam” and that “Islam, more than
any other religion human beings have devised, has all the makings of a thoroughgoing cult
of death.” SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH 109, 123 (2004). Some commentators, however,
are more reasonable. For instance, Devin Springer, James Regens and David Edger wrote that
there is a “lack of convincing evidence that the religion [Islam] itself makes its adherents
violent.” DEVIN R. SPRINGER ET AL., ISLAMIC RADICALISM AND GLOBAL JIHAD 1 (2009).
22 See infra notes 136–46 and accompanying text. Additionally, according to The Oklahoma
Chapter of the Council on Islamic Relations (CAIR-OK) Executive Director Muneer Awad,
“[r]emoving [the word] ‘Sharia’ [from proposed laws] was purely a political move” and “[t]he
goals [of the movement] are all the same: to target Islam.” Jones & Palazzolo, supra note 9.
23 CAIR-OKLAHOMA, SHARIA & INTERNATIONAL LAW BAN TIMELINE IN OKLAHOMA
(2011); see also H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (defining Sharia law as
Islamic law “based on two principal sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed”).
24 See, e.g., Our Faith on Trial, CAIR-OKLAHOMA, http://ok.cair.com/index.php/resources
/islamophobia/our-faith-on-trial (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
25 Mapping Islamophobia in Oklahoma, CAIR-OKLAHOMA, http://ok.cair.com/index.php
/?option=com_content&view=article&id=353:755&catid=79:755-main-page&Itemid=186
(last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
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CAIR-OK’s fight against the Amendment, CAIR has been the victim of vandalism
and hate mail.26
This Note will examine the use of religious law, specifically Sharia law, in
American courts, the passage of State Question 755, and then discuss the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals’ analysis of the constitutionality of the Oklahoma amend-
ment.27 Furthermore, this Note will argue that, not only is it abundantly clear that
State Question 755 is unconstitutional, but other similar proposed laws that seek to
ban state court judges from considering any type of religious law are unnecessary
and unconstitutional.28
I. BACKGROUND
A. Religious Law in American Courts
The First Amendment states in part that “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”29 While the
First Amendment prohibits the government from enacting an official state religion,
it does not prevent religions from adopting their own religious rules and prescriptions
for their followers. Various religions have created their own “laws” to be followed
by adherents.30 Halakah law governs Jews and canon law applies to select branches
of Christianity; however, no members of these religions are legally obligated by the
government (at least in the United States) to follow the law prescribed by their chosen
faith.31 Religious law often governs major life events and daily activities, such as
26 One piece of hate mail read, “you are not welcome in The United States. Go fuck camels
and whatever else you do like worshipping devils in some other country that will have you.
Get out of America. You are not welcome here!!!” Nelson, supra note 8. Another wrote, “[W]e
will work together in this country Jews and Gentiles to destroy those mosques built here, and
cover them with the blood of swine, because you’re [sic] religion is nothing more than a
superstition.” Id.
27 While various spellings have been used for “Sharia,” “Koran,” and “Mohammed,” like
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, I have used the spellings utilized in State Question 755
to avoid confusion. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 (W.D. Okla. 2010),
aff’d, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
28 For a discussion on State Question 755 as it relates to international law and an argument
that the “Save our State Amendment” is a violation of the Supremacy and Full Faith and Credit
Clauses of the United States Constitution, see Penny M. Venetis, The Unconstitutionality of
Oklahoma’s SQ 755 and Other Provisions Like It that Bar State Courts from Considering
International Law, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189 (2011).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30 See, e.g., CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41824, APPLICATION OF
RELIGIOUS LAW IN U.S. COURTS: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2011).
31 Id. at 1–2. Courts around the country have recognized Jewish law. For example, an
Illinois judge recognized In re Marriage of Goldman that “Jewish law contains both religious
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when adherents to a particular religion should attend religious services, how a person
should dress, what a person should eat, and how a person should be buried.32 To the
casual observer, it may seem that an American court would never have reason to con-
sider any type of religious law, but it is a relatively common occurrence.
In particular, Jewish law has permeated itself within American society. Jewish
law recognizes marriage as a private contract and many Jewish couples choose to
sign marriage contracts called “ketubahs.”33 The ketubah is an agreement between a
husband and wife regulating how the marriage will operate and what will happen to
the marriage in the event of divorce or death.34 Early Judaic scholars thought ketubahs
would prevent the haphazard conclusion of marriages because the ketubah often
requires the husband to pay money to the wife in the event of divorce.35 According
to traditional Jewish law, in order to complete a divorce, a woman must obtain a
“get” from a three-rabbi panel called the “beth din” (or Jewish Court).36
As a matter of pure contract law, when two parties enter into a contract, they
may designate an arbitrator to resolve any disputes that may come about as a result
of the contract.37 Multiple American jurisdictions have ruled that arbitration provi-
sions within ketubahs requiring that divorce proceedings take place before a beth din
can be enforceable in civil court.38 For example, in Avitzur v. Avitzur, the plaintiff
wife sought to bring her defendant husband before a beth din pursuant to their ketu-
bah so that the plaintiff could obtain a religious divorce pursuant to Jewish law.39
There was no doubt that the defendant had signed a ketubah stating that he would
engage in such a process.40 The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the
ketubah was just like any other antenuptial agreement that would refer the issue to
rules and secular laws, including such matters as contracts, torts, property and family law.”
554 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
32 Nelson, supra note 8.
33 MICHAEL J. BROYDE, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND THE ABANDONED WIFE IN JEWISH
LAW 2 (2001).
34 Id.
35 Jodi M. Solovy, Civil Enforcement of Jewish Marriage and Divorce: Constitutional
Accommodation of a Religious Mandate, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 495 (1996).
36 Id. at 493, 499–500.
37 Layman’s Guide to Dinei Torah (Beth Din Arbitration Proceedings), BETH DIN OF
AMERICA 2, available at http://www.bethdin.org/docs/PDF1-Layman’s_Guide.pdf (last visited
Oct. 14, 2012).
38 See, e.g., Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983); see also In re Marriage of
Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (ordering a husband to appear before
a beth din, noting that the Court “merely applied well-established principles of contract law
to enforce the agreement made by the parties” because “[t]he terms of the order were care-
fully limited to avoid interference with religious doctrine”). But see Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685
A.2d 523, 530–31 (N.J. Ch. 1996) (refusing to order ex-husband to appear before a beth din
as it would violate his First Amendment rights).
39 Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 137.
40 Id. at 138.
2012] THE ONLY THING WE HAVE TO FEAR IS FEAR ITSELF 279
a non-judicial forum and citing precedent that “an agreement to refer a matter con-
cerning marriage to arbitration suffers no inherent invalidity.”41
B. Sharia
In today’s political climate, Muslim scholars and leaders often find themselves
explaining what is not Sharia as opposed to what is Sharia.42 Sharia is the moral and
legal code of Islam.43 It has no binding authority in the American court system.44
Sharia comes from the Koran, the teachings of the prophet Mohammed, universal
agreement among Islamic scholars, and individual analogical reasoning (if a specific
matter is not addressed by the preceding sources).45 Like with any type of religious
legal system, Muslims differ as to how Sharia should be interpreted and how Islamic
law should apply in everyday life.46 One professor describes Sharia as “living a pious
life devoted to realizing God’s justice in the world.”47 As Sharia law is so diffuse,
scholars frequently express concerns that if Sharia law, similar to other religious law,
is applied in American courts, judges (and their clerks) might find themselves attempt-
ing to interpret centuries of religious law without the benefit of any real standards
or definitive authority.48 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly empha-
sized that “courts should refrain from trolling through a person’s or institution’s
religious beliefs.”49
With these concerns in mind, it is important to once again reemphasize that
Sharia “law” is not law in the traditional sense that is commonly understood in the
American legal system; rather, it is an amalgamation of religious principles that
govern the daily activities of Muslims.50 Sharia law is fluid and adaptable to differ-
ent circumstances, including the laws of the country where a Muslim resides.51 In
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., Nathan B. Oman, How to Judge Shari’a Contracts: A Guide to Islamic
Marriage Agreements in American Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 287, 287 (noting that “[f]or
many in the West, the term shari’a conjures images of brutal punishments such as cutting
off the hands of thieves or stoning adulterers to death”); Dan Merica, Muslim Campaign
Looks to Repair Sharia’s Reputation, CNN BELIEF BLOG (Mar. 2, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://
religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/02/muslim-campaign-looks-to-repair-sharias-reputation/;
Telephone Interview with Muneer Awad, supra note 19.
43 ENCYC. BRITANNICA, BRITANNICA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD RELIGIONS 991 (2006).
44 See, e.g., BROUGHER, supra note 30, at 8.
45 ENCYC. BRITANNICA, supra note 43, at 991.
46 BROUGHER, note 30, at 5.
47 Oman, supra note 42, at 288.
48 See, e.g., BROUGHER, supra note 30, at 8–9.
49 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000).
50 See, e.g., Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d, 670
F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
51 Id.
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fact, Sharia mandates that Muslims accept the law of the land and specifically re-
quires American Muslims to follow the United States Constitution.52
C. The Use of Islam in American Courts
Islamic law is considered in American court rooms for multiple reasons. “Sharia
principles can be used to guide Muslims in marriage contracts, business contracts,
child custody agreements, dietary customs, non-interest-based financial agreements,
wills and testaments, charitable giving, and more.”53 Furthermore, a judge might
need to consider Islamic law if Sharia forms the basis of a foreign law governing a
dispute in the United States.54 Islamic law can also be used to clarify an issue for a
judge or to explain an ambiguity.55 Contract law is another area in which judges are
asked to enforce Islamic law, and courts have regularly stated that “‘biblically based
mediation[s]’ . . . are enforceable.”56 In 2003, a Texas court ruled that a signed arbi-
tration agreement providing for mediation in a Texas Islamic court was enforceable.57
In 2004, a Minnesota court approved an award from an Islamic Arbitration Committee
applying Sharia law, pursuant to a partnership agreement.58 Additionally, according
to University of Pittsburgh law professor and Islamic law expert, Haider Ala Hamoudi,
judges must sometimes use religious law in order to determine marital status in immi-
gration cases.59 Islamic law also regularly intersects with family law. For example,
in Aziz v. Aziz,60 a New York trial court upheld that an Islamic “mahr” (a payment
on a marriage and subsequent payment upon divorce) could be enforced as a secular
contract even though it was created during a religious ceremony.61
In the New Jersey case of S.D. v. M.J.R.,62 a Moroccan Muslim woman appealed
from a trial court denial of a restraining order sought against her Moroccan Muslim
52 Telephone Interview with Muneer Awad, supra note 19; see also Ziriax, 754 F. Supp.
2d at 1306.
53 Understanding Sharia, CAIR-OKLAHOMA, http://ok.cair.com/index.php/resources
/islamophobia/sharia (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
54 Elliot, supra note 18. It is important to note that American courts will only enforce a
foreign law if the law comports with the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Nelson, supra
note 8.
55 Elliot, supra note 18.
56 BROUGHER, supra note 30, at 3 (citing Woodlands Christian Academy v. Weibust,
No. 09-10-00010-CV (Tex. App. October 7, 2010); Easterly v. Heritage Christian Schools,
107 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 173 (S.D. Ind. 2009)).
57 Id. (citing Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. App. 2003)).
58 Id. (citing Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)).
59 Ann Rodgers, Proposed State Law Draws Religious Criticism, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Mar. 12, 2012, http://post-gazette.com/pg/11346/1196328-454-0.stm.
60 488 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
61 Id. at 124. For a discussion on “mahr,” see Oman, supra note 42, at 291–92.
62 2 A.3d 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
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husband.63 The couple did not know each other before their arranged marriage (when
the woman was seventeen years old), and they came to the United States for an em-
ployment opportunity.64 S.D. sought a restraining order from her husband because of
multiple instances of physical abuse leading up to repeated unwanted and abusive,
non-consensual sexual intercourse.65 Throughout this multi-month ordeal that in-
cluded food deprivation and being left alone for many hours, S.D. testified that M.J.R.
told her “this is according to our religion. You are my wife, I c[an] do anything to you.
The woman, she should submit and do anything I ask her to do.”66
While M.J.R. presented reasonably believable facts at the trial level denying
S.D.’s allegations, the trial court judge found that the husband had engaged in ha-
rassment and assault but neither sexual assault nor criminal sexual conduct.67 The
judge explained his ruling on the sex-related charges, noting that he believed the
defendant husband did not have the necessary criminal intent to commit a sexual
crime as the husband believed his actions were consistent with his religious beliefs
about the role of women in society.68 The judge then refused to order a final restrain-
ing order, noting that the defendant had filed for divorce and that there was no reason
for the couple to be together at all.69
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed the trial court de-
cision because the lower decision was based on the husband’s intent, whereas the
state’s sexual assault and criminal sexual contact statutes “do not designate a spe-
cific culpability requirement.”70 Furthermore, the court noted that the husband’s
“conduct in engaging in non-consensual sexual intercourse was unquestionably
knowing, regardless of his view that his religion permitted him to act as he did.”71
Recognizing the clear conflict between state and Islamic law, the appellate court chas-
tised the trial court judge for forgiving the defendant for his clear violations of state
law due to his religious beliefs.72
The appellate court cited U. S. Supreme Court precedent that while the First
Amendment allows for freedom of religious practice, it does not prevent the govern-
ment from upholding relevant criminal and civil statutes if there is a compelling
63 Id. at 412–13.
64 Id. at 413.
65 Id. at 413–15.
66 Id. at 416. The couple’s Imam also testified at trial. Id. at 417. He stated that Islamic
law requires a wife to acquiesce to her husband’s demands for sex because the husband is
forbidden from seeking sexual gratification elsewhere. Id. at 417–18. However, the Imam
stated that Muslim men are prohibited from treating their women like animals. Id. at 418.
67 Id. at 418.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 418–19.
70 Id. at 421.
71 Id. at 422.
72 Id.
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government interest to do so.73 The appellate division concluded that the trial court
judge erred by not issuing a final restraining order, and flatly rejected the view that
the husband’s acts were excused because they were “culturally acceptable.”74 In sum,
the appellate court expressed its view that adherents to Sharia law must follow the
laws of the state; but, Sharia law can be enforceable in American courts when it does
not conflict with existing state law.75
D. “Save Our State Amendment”
In order to frame the discussion about the constitutionality of a law banning
state courts from considering all religious law, I first examine the controversial
Oklahoma law that bans state court consideration of Sharia law. Oklahoma’s con-
stitutional amendment states that Oklahoma courts:
when exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and ad-
here to the law as provided in the United States Constitution, the
Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regula-
tions promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the
Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and
if necessary the law of another state of the United States provided
the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making
judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts
of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not con-
sider international law or Sharia Law. The provisions of this
subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts
including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.76
When Oklahoma voters entered the polling booth on Election Day 2010, they saw
the following statement explaining the constitutional amendment:
This measure amends the State Constitution. It changes a section
that deals with the courts of this state. It would amend Article 7,
Section 1. It makes courts rely on federal and state law when de-
ciding cases. It forbids courts from considering or using interna-
tional law. It forbids courts from considering or using Sharia Law.
International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals
with the conduct of international organizations and independent
73 Id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878)).
74 Id. at 426–27.
75 See id. at 422–23.
76 OKLA. CONST. art. VII § 1 (emphasis added).
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nations, such as countries, states and tribes. It deals with their
relationship with each other. It also deals with some of their rela-
tionships with persons.
The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized
nations. Sources of international law also include international
agreements, as well as treaties.
Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources,
the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.77
Oklahoma is home to a population of approximately thirty thousand Muslims.78
According to CAIR-OK, while there was some initial finger-pointing at the Muslim
community following the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building
in Oklahoma City,79 Muslims have lived relatively peacefully in the state for close
to half a century.80 In fact, Oklahoma was one of a very small group of states that
saw no hate crimes against Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.81
The idea to ban Sharia law in state courts did not come out of thin air. According
to CAIR-OK, the premise did not come forward until Muslim-bashing became a
politically popular and acceptable practice.82 David Yerushalmi, a New York lawyer
who is leading a well-organized and well-funded “campaign of misinformation”
against Islam,83 drafted much of the model legislation—called “American Laws for
American Courts”—to ban Sharia law.84 Furthermore, the anti-Islam organization
ACT! for America has been a primary proponent of the model law.85
77 H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010).
78 Joel Siegel, Islamic Sharia Law to Be Banned in, ah, Oklahoma, ABC NEWS (June 14,
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/Media/oklahoma-pass-laws-prohibiting-islamic-Sharia
-laws-apply/story?id=10908521.
79 Following the bombing, a former Oklahoma Congressman stated on national television
that there was “very clear evidence” that “fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups” were re-
sponsible for the bombing. MARK S. HAMM, APOCALYPSE IN OKLAHOMA 54 (1997). In actu-
ality, Timothy McVeigh, a non-Muslim, was ultimately sentenced to death for the brutal murder
of 168 people. Jo Thomas, McVeigh Jury Decides on Sentence of Death in Oklahoma Bombing,
N.Y. TIMES June 14, 1997, at A1.
80 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Muneer Awad, supra note 19.
81 Id. Mr. Awad described the Oklahoma Muslim community as tight-knit and “pretty
successfully integrated.” Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Elliot, supra note 18.
85 Id. ACT! for America’s stated mission is to combat radical Islam. About Act! for America,
ACT! FOR AMERICA, http://www.actforamerica.org/index.php/learn/about-act-for-america
(last visited Oct. 14, 2012). The group has taken credit for the passage of anti-Sharia laws
in three states. Id.
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Republican State Representative Rex Duncan was the leader, author, and co-
sponsor of the bill that put a referendum banning Sharia law in front of Oklahoma
voters.86 In proposing the bill, Representative Duncan told a reporter that “this is a
war for the survival of America. It’s a cultural war, it’s a social war, it’s a war for
the survival of our country.”87 Duncan said he was first inspired to propose the law
after hearing of the domestic violence case in New Jersey.88 The decision of the New
Jersey trial court judge in S.D. v. M.J.R. is presumably the type of scenario that State
Question 755 and laws banning the consideration of all religious law seek to prevent.
However, University of Oklahoma Law Professor Joseph Thai says that the New
Jersey case shows exactly why a law like State Question 755 is unnecessary.89 He
argues that the strong reprimand of the trial court judge’s decision by the Appeals
Court proves that the American justice system works because “American courts will
not enforce foreign laws that are contrary to public policy.”90
In addition to Mr. Duncan’s concerns about the New Jersey domestic violence
case, the Representative’s past actions have shown that he is avowedly anti-Muslim.91
If keeping foreign and religious law out of the courtroom was so important to Mr.
Duncan, why not adopt a law with the goal of banning all religious law from con-
sideration, as other states have done? Representative Duncan seems to believe it
would be proper for courts to use Christian and Jewish law in the decision-making
process because:
Oklahomans recognize that America was founded on Judeo-
Christian principles . . . [a]nd State Question 755, the Save Our
State Amendment, is just a simple effort to ensure that our courts
are not used to undermine those founding principles and turn
Oklahoma into something that our founding fathers and our
great-grandparents wouldn’t recognize.92
86 Nelson, supra note 8.
87 Id. Additionally, Representative Duncan has called Islam “the face of the enemy.” Id.
Representative Duncan has also called Islam a “cancer” and “dangerous.” Interview by Sean
Hannity with Rex Duncan, Okla. State Rep., Oklahoma Lawmaker Wants Shariah Law Banned,
FOX NEWS (June 18, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933
,595026,00.html).
88 Nelson, supra note 8.
89 Id.
90 Id. Mr. Thai is one of Mr. Awad’s attorneys. CAIR-OKLAHOMA, supra note 23.
91 See, e.g., Am. Constitution Soc’y, Okla. Lawmaker Pushes Ban on Religious Headwear
in Driver’s License Photos, ACSBLOG (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/node
/12993; Mick Hinton, Official Refuses Copy of Quran, TULSA WORLD , Feb. 15, 2008, http://
www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?articleID=071023_1_a1_spanc46170.
92 CAIRtv, CAIR Video: SQ 755 Sponsor Explains Purpose of Amendment on MSNBC,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ybvivrs_MH0.
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Additionally, Mr. Duncan was the driving force behind a 2009 proposed law to ban
all religious headwear from appearing in driver’s license photographs and very
publicly refused to accept a copy of the Koran from the Governor’s Ethnic Ameri-
can Advisory Council in celebration of Oklahoma’s 100th anniversary.93
Ironically, no Oklahoma state court opinion has even mentioned the word
“Sharia.”94 While Representative Duncan claimed that State Question 755 is “a
pre-emptive strike,”95 outside of irrational and prejudiced fears about the Muslim
population, it appears that there was little to no factual evidence that Oklahoma
needed or needs “saving” from Sharia law.96
II. AWAD V. ZIRIAX
On November 4, 2010, Mr. Muneer Awad, Executive Director of CAIR-OK filed
a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to block the enact-
ment of State Question 755.97 The complaint asserted that implementation of the con-
stitutional amendment would force courts to unconstitutionally “take positions with
respect to . . . religious doctrines.”98 Furthermore, Awad asserted that implementa-
tion of the law would interfere with the court’s ability, as the executor of his estate,
to properly probate his last will and testament.99
Finding that Mr. Awad was likely to win on the merits and suffer irreparable
injury, Chief District Court Judge Vicki Miles-La Grange granted a temporary re-
straining order and enjoined the Agency Head of the Oklahoma State Board of
Elections “from certifying the election results for State Question 755.”100 Less than
three weeks later, the court heard arguments for a preliminary injunction to enjoin
the certification of the election results.101
93 Am. Constitution Soc’y, supra note 91. See also Hinton, supra note 91. In rejecting the
copy of the Koran, Representative Duncan wrote his fellow legislators that “[m]ost Okla-
homans do not endorse the idea of killing innocent women and children in the name of
ideology.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
94 Venetis, supra note 28, at 191.
95 James C. McKinley, Jr., U.S. Judge Blocks a Ban on Islamic Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2010, at A22.
96 See Venetis, supra note 28, at 191.
97 Complaint Seeking a Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction at 1–2,
Awad v. Ziriax, No. CIV-10-1186-M (W.D. Okla. Nov. 4, 2010). Mr. Awad filed his com-
plaint against Paul Ziriax, the head of the Oklahoma State Board of Elections. Id. ¶ 5, at 2.
98 Id. ¶ 22, at 6.
99 Id. ¶¶ 24–26, at 7. Mr. Awad argued that the court’s failure to accept his will would
prevent him from being buried in accordance with Islamic principles. Nelson, supra note 8.
100 Awad v. Ziriax, No. CIV-10-1186-M, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119660, at *9,*12–13
(W.D. Okla., Nov. 9, 2010).
101 Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d, 670 F.3d 1111
(10th Cir. 2012).
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On November 29, 2010, Judge Miles-La Grange found the anti-Sharia law to be
in violation of both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amend-
ment.102 In congruence with her findings, she granted a preliminary injunction barring
the state election agency chief from certifying the results of State Question 755.103
In making her decision, Judge Miles-La Grange fully recognized that she was addres-
sing issues “that go to the very foundation of our country” and that an adverse de-
cision had the potential to harm the constitutional rights of Oklahoma’s minority
Muslim community.104
The State of Oklahoma appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals.105 Oral argument on State Question 755 was heard on September 12, 2011,
one day after the tenth anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks.106 The court
released its opinion,107 written by Judge Scott Matheson, upholding the trial court’s
decision on January 10, 2012.108
After providing a brief overview of the constitutional amendment process in
Oklahoma and examining the passage of State Question 755, the court considered the
justiciability of Mr. Awad’s claim.109 The Tenth Circuit found “that the district court
did not abuse its discretion” in finding that Mr. Awad’s claim was justiciable.110 In
agreement with the district court, Judge Matheson found that standing can be “con-
ferred by non-economic religious values”111 because Awad’s injury went “beyond a
‘psychological consequence’ from disagreement with . . . government conduct”112 and
because he suffered multiple injuries in fact: the official state condemnation of his
religion and the inability for his last will and testament to be executed by the court.113
Judge Matheson next analyzed whether the district court properly granted a pre-
liminary injunction to the plaintiffs.114 In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, Awad
had to show that “(1) [he] is substantially likely to succeed on the merits; (2) [he] will
102 Id. at 1306–07.
103 Id. at 1308.
104 Id. at 1301, 1303.
105 Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
106 See John Ingold, Denver’s 10th Circuit Court in Spotlight as It Considers Oklahoma’s
Shariah-Law Case, DENVER POST, Sept. 13, 2011, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci
_18881457.
107 Awad, 670 F.3d 1111.
108 Id. at 1116.
109 Id. at 1116–19. Finding that Awad had sufficient grounds to obtain a preliminary
injunction for his Establishment Clause claim, the Court did not address his Free Exercise
Clause Claim. Id. at 1119.
110 Id. at 1119.
111 Id. at 1122 (citing O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2005)).
112 Id. at 1123 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982)).
113 Id. at 1120, 1123. The Court also found that Mr. Awad’s complaint was ripe for review
because the threatened harm was sufficiently imminent. Id. at 1123.
114 Id. at 1125.
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suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) [his] threatened injury out-
weighs the injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) the
injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.”115
The court applied the Larson test to determine whether Mr. Awad was likely to
succeed on the merits.116 According to the Tenth Circuit, “[t]he Larson test provides
that if a law discriminates among religions, it can survive only if it is ‘closely fitted
to the furtherance of any compelling interest asserted.’”117 Furthermore, “[s]trict scru-
tiny is required when laws discriminate among religions because [n]eutral treatment
of religions [is] the clearest command of the Establishment Clause.”118 The court
wrote that Larson strict scrutiny was applicable because State Question 755 so clearly
targets Islam.119 “To survive strict scrutiny under Larson,” the court noted that the
suspect statute would need to advance “a compelling government interest, and . . .
[be] ‘closely fitted’ to that compelling interest.”120 Citing past Supreme Court pre-
cedent, Judge Matheson wrote that any compelling interest would need to be based
on “an actual, concrete problem”—not an assumption ungrounded in fact—and that
the proposed government regulation must actually address that problem.121 The
State’s less-than-robust comment on the matter was, “Oklahoma certainly has a com-
pelling interest in determining what law is applied in Oklahoma courts.”122 Noting
that the State had failed to identify any actual problems with consideration of Islamic
law in Oklahoma courts (as the State was unable to identify a “single instance where
an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law or used legal precepts of other nations or
cultures, let alone that such applications or uses had resulted in concrete problems in
Oklahoma”), the State failed to meet the “compelling interest” prong of Larson and
thus failed strict scrutiny analysis.123
The court also easily found that Awad met the second, third, and fourth prongs
for a preliminary injunction.124 The Tenth Circuit found that Mr. Awad was likely to
face irreparable injury if the anti-Sharia amendment took effect.125 It also agreed with
the district court that Awad had shown that his threatened injury outweighed the po-
tential injury to the State.126 As summed up by the district court judge, the plaintiff’s
115 Id. (citing Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., L.L.C., 562 F.3d 1067,
1070 (10th Cir. 2009)).
116 Id. at 1128.
117 Id. at 1127 (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982)).
118 Id. (citing Colorado Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
119 Id. at 1128. “The amendment bans only one form of religious law—Sharia law.” Id.
at 1129.
120 Id. at 1129 (citing Larson, 456 U.S. at 246–47).
121 Id. at 1129–30.
122 Id. at 1130.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1131–32.
125 Id. at 1131.
126 Id. at 1131–32.
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potential loss of his First Amendment rights outweighed the harm of “delaying the
will of the voters being carried out by certifying the election results” because the
Bill of Rights is the lynchpin of American values.127 Finally, the court of appeals
found that Awad had shown that an injunction would not be adverse to the public
interest because, “[w]hile the public has an interest in the will of the voters being
carried out . . . the public has a more profound and long-term interest in upholding
an individual’s constitutional rights.”128
Mr. Awad, the district court, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals all agreed:
the passage of State Question 755 was a violation of Mr. Awad’s First Amendment
Rights.129 As Oklahoma has not appealed Judge Matheson’s opinion to the Supreme
Court, the Tenth Circuit’s opinion is the only appellate decision addressing a state
law banning court consideration of a specific religious doctrine.130 As legal scholars
and judges seem fairly certain that the targeting of a specific religion’s laws and
canons would be a First Amendment Violation,131 the remainder of this Note will
focus on the constitutionality of proposed statutes and state constitutional amend-
ments banning courts from considering any religious law.132
III. BANNING THE CONSIDERATION OF ALL RELIGIOUS LAW133
Recognizing that laws specifically banning the consideration of Sharia present
serious constitutional issues, some anti-Muslim legislators and political operatives
have sought to adopt laws that ban the consideration of all religious law by state courts
as a means of assuring that Islamic law is unable to infiltrate American courtrooms.134
Utilizing some of the same Free Exercise and Establishment Clause tests used in
Awad v. Ziriax,135 I will argue that an outright ban on the consideration of religious
doctrine in judicial decisions is also an unconstitutional encroachment on key First
Amendment rights.
Examples of proposed laws to ban the consideration of all religious law are
abundant. In 2011, a Texas legislator proposed amending the Texas Constitution to
127 Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d, 670 F.3d 1111
(10th Cir. 2012).
128 Awad, 670 F.3d at 1132 (quoting Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1308).
129 However, the Tenth Circuit only addressed Mr. Awad’s Establishment Clause claims.
130 As the unconstitutionality of State Question 755 has never been in serious doubt, it is
unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court will consider this case. See, e.g., Telephone Interview
with Muneer Awad, supra note 19.
131 See, e.g., id.; see also Nelson, supra note 8.
132 For further discussion of Islamophobia and a First Amendment analysis of anti-sharia
initiatives, see Asthma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First Amendment Analysis of Anti-Sharia
Initiatives, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363 (2012).
133 For the remainder of this Note, I will sometimes refer to laws that ban state courts from
considering any type of religious law as “anti-religion laws.”
134 See, e.g., BROUGHER, supra note 30, at 10–11.
135 Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1126–29 (10th Cir. 2012).
2012] THE ONLY THING WE HAVE TO FEAR IS FEAR ITSELF 289
add a clause stating, “[a] court of this state may not enforce, consider, or apply any
religious or cultural law.”136 A proposed Arizona law reads:
A court shall not use, implement, refer to or incorporate a tenet
of any body of religious sectarian law into any decision, finding
or opinion as controlling or influential authority. . . . Any deci-
sion or ratification of a private agreement that is determined, on
the merits, by a judge in this state who relies on any body of
religious sectarian law . . . is void, is appealable error and is
grounds for impeachment and removal from office.137
A Pennsylvania legislator also proposed a law in 2011 that would “ban [state] courts
from considering any ‘foreign legal code or system.’”138 While the proposed Penn-
sylvania law does not specifically mention Islam or Sharia law,139 supporting docu-
ments for the Bill suggest that it was clearly conceived with animus toward Islam
and other religious law.140 In fact, despite the author’s initial comments about the
threat of Sharia, many Orthodox Jews are actually worried that the law could com-
plicate their divorce cases that sometimes end up in civil court.141 The South Dakota
legislature passed a law banning the consideration of “religious code,” and while the
law did not specifically mention Islam, one state legislator noted, “I would be less
than fully honest with you if I didn’t also say that part of the purpose of [the law] is
to deal with what I am going to say generally has been referred to as Shariah law.”142
136 H.J.R. Res. 57, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011) (referred to State Affairs Committee
on Feb. 21, 2011).
137 H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (held in committee on March 14,
2011). The Arizona Bill defines “religious sectarian law” as “any statute, tenet or body of
law evolving within and binding a specific religious sect or tribe. Religious sectarian law
includes Sharia law, canon law, halacha and karma but does not include any law of the
United States or the individual states based on Anglo-American legal tradition and principles
on which the United States was founded.” Id.
138 Rodgers, supra note 59.
139 Id.
140 Unsurprisingly, the law was drafted by anti-Muslim and anti-Sharia activist David
Yerushalmi. Rodgers, supra note 59. See also Memorandum from State Representative
RoseMarie Swanger on American and Pennsylvania Laws for Pennsylvania Courts—Shariah
Law to All House Members (June 14, 2011), available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us
/WU01/LI/CSM/2011/0/8559.pdf (warning against Sharia as “inherently hostile to our con-
stitutional liberties . . . a violation of the principles on which our nation was founded” and
“finding [its] way into US court cases”) [hereinafter Memorandum from State Representative
Rose Marie Swagger].
141 Rodgers, supra note 59. As noted above, Orthodox Judaism does not allow for civil
divorce. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
142 Kari Huus, South Dakota Lawmakers Tackle ‘Shariah Question,’ MSNBC (Mar. 2,
2012), http://usnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/03/02/10553424-south-dakota-lawmakers
-tackle-shariah-question.
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While neither the Texas,143 Arizona,144 nor Pennsylvania145 laws have passed, adop-
tion of these types of laws would present serious constitutional issues. Why even
pass these laws? According to one Florida Legislator, his constituents want these
laws and they “want to get ahead of the problem before it spreads.”146
A. The Free Exercise Clause
The first clause of the First Amendment can never be repeated too often:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.”147 The latter part of the clause is commonly referred to as
the Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise Clause guarantees, as a fundamental
constitutional right of all Americans, “the right to believe and profess whatever reli-
gious doctrine one desires.”148 The Clause’s purpose is to prevent state and local gov-
ernments from discriminating against a particular religion and to “secure religious
liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority.”149
Prior to 1990, the Supreme Court required a state to show a “compelling interest” to
justify the abridgment of a citizen’s free exercise rights.150 However, in Employment
Division v. Smith (Smith II),151 Justice Antonin Scalia overrode decades of precedent
by writing, “[t]he First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty does not require
[a compelling interest].”152 Sadly, the current Supreme Court does not support a very
strong Free Exercise Clause.153
In response to the Court’s denigration of religious freedoms, Congress adopted
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to restore the “compelling interest”
test.154 However, the Supreme Court found the RFRA to be a violation of the sep-
aration of powers doctrine when applied to state laws.155 In response, many states,
143 H.J.R. Res. 57, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011).
144 H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
145 Rodgers, supra note 59.
146 Jones & Palazzolo, supra note 9. Among other states, Virginia also unsuccessfully at-
tempted to adopt a law “to ban the use of any legal code established outside the United States
in U.S. courtrooms” but was primarily targeted at Islamic Sharia law. Robert P. Jones, The State
of Anti-Sharia Bills, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2012, 3:55 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/figuring-faith/post/the-state-of-anti-sharia-bills/2012/02/29/gIQAql5miR_blog.html.
147 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
148 Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
149 School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
150 63 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Free Exercise Cases Until 1990 § 2 (2001) [herein-
after Free Exercise Cases].
151 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
152 Id. at 889.
153 See, e.g., DANIEL O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 82
(2d ed. 2009).
154 Free Exercise Cases, supra note 150.
155 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Free Exercise Cases, supra
note 150.
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including Oklahoma, adopted their own versions of the RFRA, thus restoring the
“compelling interest” test to many American jurisdictions.156 It is important to note
that the Smith II decision only removed the “compelling interest” test as it applies
to neutral laws but remained in effect for non-neutral and biased laws.157
1. Non-Neutral Laws
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah158 helps to explain why
State Question 755 is so clearly unconstitutional and why anti-religion laws could
also be found unconstitutional. In Lukumi Babalu, the Supreme Court ruled that a
city ordinance banning the ritual slaughter of animals was a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause, as the ordinance was biased and the city failed to present a compel-
ling government interest for banning the slaughter.159 In doing so, the Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, laid out a test, post–Smith II, for ana-
lyzing laws that directly conflict with the First Amendment.160 Justice Kennedy began
his opinion by reporting, “[t]he principle that government may not enact laws that
suppress religious belief or practice is so well understood that few violations are
recorded in our opinions.”161
A brief summary of the facts in Lukumi Babalu is necessary to understand the
Court’s decision. The religion at issue in the case was Santeria.162 Practitioners of
Santeria express their faith using spirits called “orishas.”163 According to Santeria,
every person has a destiny with God and the only way to reach that destiny is by
seeking the help of the “orishas.”164 One principle way of showing dedication to the
“orishas” is through the sacrifice of animals.165 In 1987, Santeria adherents began
plans to establish a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida.166 Frightened by the prospect
of animal sacrifices in their backyards, the Hialeah City Council adopted a variety of
156 Free Exercise Cases, supra note 150. The Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act states,
“[n]o governmental entity shall substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion
unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is: 1. Essential to further
a compelling government interest; and 2. The least restrictive means of furthering that com-
pelling governmental interest.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 253(B) (2000).
157 See Church of the Lukumbi Babalu Ave, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32
(1993).
158 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 531–32.
161 Id. at 523.
162 Id. at 524.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. These sacrifices are made during important life events such as births, marriages,
and deaths. Id. at 525. They are also used to help cure the sick and to initiate new priests into
the Santeria religion. Id.
166 Id. at 525–26.
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resolutions and ordinances expressing fear of certain religions “engag[ing] in prac-
tices which are inconsistent with public morals,” banning the needless killing of
animals, and “oppos[ing] the ritual sacrifices of animals.”167 Citing a violation of the
Church’s rights under the Free Exercise Clause, the Church sued the City and sought
a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.168 The district court and the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals found for the City but the Supreme Court reversed.169
In ruling for the Santeria Church, the Court noted that “religious beliefs need not
be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection.”170 Noting that laws which fail to be neutral or generally ap-
plicable are inherently suspect, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the City of Hialeah
in requiring that the law “be justified by a compelling governmental interest and
must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”171
Before applying strict scrutiny analysis, the Court needed to determine whether
the city ordinance was neutral. “[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral . . . .”172 The
Court tells us that “[a] law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice
without a secular meaning discernible from the language or context.”173 Even if a law
is not facially invalid, the law can still be biased and harmful to a certain religion.174
The Lukumi Babalu Court determined that the wording of the ordinances adopted
by Hialeah was meant to specifically prevent Santeria animal sacrifices because the
only conduct impacted by the ordinances was “the religious exercise of Santeria
church members.”175 There was little doubt in the Court’s mind that the sole purpose
of the ordinances was to suppress Santeria.176
Additionally, in finding that the laws violated the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court also determined that the ordinances were not generally applicable, but were in
fact motivated by pure animus toward the Santeria Church.177 Finding that the animal
slaughter ordinances were neither neutral nor of general applicability, the Court easily
applied strict scrutiny and found that the government had no compelling interest and
167 Id. at 526–27.
168 Id. at 528.
169 Id. at 520, 530–32.
170 Id. at 531 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714
(1981)).
171 Id. at 531–32.
172 Id. at 533.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 534.
175 Id. at 535–36. The comments and climate surrounding the passage of the ordinances also
suggest that the ordinance’s sole purpose was to harm the Santeria Church. A city council-
man was quoted as saying, “What can we do to prevent the Church from opening?” Id.
at 541. Hialeah’s Police Chaplain said that Santeria was “foolishness” and “an abomination
to the Lord.” Id.
176 Id. at 542.
177 Id. at 545.
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no narrowly tailored solution to the animal slaughter “problem.”178 In essence, the
Court reaffirmed, consistent with past precedent, that the Free Exercise Clause
“protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment.”179
As Justice Kennedy reminded us in Lukumi Babalu, a “law that is neutral and of
general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even
if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”180
Would a law that banned the consideration of all religious law be considered gen-
erally applicable? In order to make this determination, we must analyze whether such
a law is neutral and of general applicability. This Note argues that the relevant case
law and First Amendment principles support the notion that a prohibition on state
court judges from considering any religious law is biased against, and harmful to,
religious people and would prevent the free exercise of one’s faith, thus violating
the First Amendment. In the Lukumi Babalu decision, Justice Kennedy stated:
The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to religious
tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state
intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its
practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high
duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures. Those in of-
fice must be resolute in resisting importunate demands and must
ensure that the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and
regulation are secular. Legislators may not devise mechanisms,
overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion or
its practices.181
Legislative hearings, statements by bill sponsors, and media reports show that
proposals to ban the consideration of religion in state courts might meet Justice
Kennedy’s “slight suspicion” threshold, as it is quite clear that supporters of these
bills have religious intolerance on their minds.182
A law banning a state court from considering any type of religious law could
easily be found to be biased against religious people and, in particular, Muslims.
“[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation, the law is not neutral . . . .”183 In order to be neutral, a law can-
not discriminate on its face.184 Both the proposed Texas and Arizona laws specifically
178 Id. at 546–47.
179 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 148 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
180 Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 531.
181 Id. at 547.
182 See, e.g., supra notes 136–46 and accompanying text.
183 Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 533.
184 Id.
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mention the ban of religious law in state courts.185 Through their specific textual ref-
erences to religion, the proposed laws discriminate against religious people (as op-
posed to the non-religious) on their face.186 The proposed Pennsylvania law does not
specifically mention religion; however, the Court has discussed that “[o]fficial action
that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere
compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.”187
Because proposed “facially neutral” laws may not seem to be targeting religion
in general or Islam specifically, courts must be especially careful in searching for
“masked” hostility toward religion.188 In the case of Pennsylvania, state legislators
have made their intent all too well known. In a letter to her fellow Pennsylvania
House of Representatives members proposing a ban on “foreign laws and legal sys-
tems,” Republican bill sponsor Representative RoseMarie Swanger entitled her memo,
“American and Pennsylvania Laws for Pennsylvania Courts—Shariah Law.”189 By
calling Sharia “hostile” in an effort to garner support, the author makes her discrimi-
natory intent fairly obvious.190 Representative Swanger proclaims, “I don’t mean to dis-
criminate against anybody. I just want to see everybody protected under our law.”191
Nonetheless, while it is possible that Representative Swanger’s intention was to pro-
tect people from harm, circumstantial evidence suggests a more nefarious purpose.
The specific targeting of Sharia shows that this type of law is not meant to be neutral
or generally applicable and is thus subject to strict scrutiny. Even if Representative
Swanger can show a compelling government interest (her concern that the consider-
ation of foreign or religious law by courts will result in a lack of legal protection for
some citizens), her worries and proposed solution are simply unwarranted, as it is
a well-known tenet of American judicial review that “American courts will not en-
force foreign laws that are contrary to public policy.”192
2. Burdensome Laws
Recognizing that many will characterize the proposed anti-religion laws as neu-
tral laws of general applicability, we must consider how the U.S. Supreme Court views
laws that it determines to be neutral and generally applicable.193 Unfortunately, the
185 See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
186 See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
187 Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 534.
188 See, e.g., id.
189 Memorandum from State Representative RoseMarie Swanger, supra note 140.
190 Id.
191 Bryan Schwartzman, Should Shariah Count in Court?, JEWISH EXPONENT (Dec. 21,
2011), http://www.jewishexponent.com/article/24991/Should_Shariah_Count_in_Court?.
192 See Nelson supra note 8.
193 Any reasonable reading of the district court and Tenth Circuit’s opinions when applied
to Awad v. Ziriax shows that Question 755 specifically targets Islam and would never pass
the Lukumi Babalu analysis. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012); Awad v.
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Lukumi Babalu decision does not address what would have happened if the animal
sacrifice law was one of general applicability and not adopted with animus toward
Santeria practitioners.194 As noted above, the Supreme Court has stated that neutral
laws “of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest even if [they] ha[ve] the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious
practice.”195 However, analyzing some of the Court’s direct versus indirect burden
cases can show how, even if a law is deemed to be neutral and generally applicable,
the law could still be struck down as unconstitutional.
In these “burden” cases, a plaintiff usually sues claiming that “she cannot com-
ply with the law and remain faithful to her religious beliefs.”196 As previously ref-
erenced, in Smith II, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a generally applicable
Oregon law that denied unemployment benefits to workers who were fired due to
their use of illegal narcotics, even though their religious beliefs supported the use
of the drug in question (peyote).197 The Court found that the ban on illegal drug use
was a proper, neutral, and generally applicable exercise of the state’s police power.198
In United States v. Lee,199 the Court ruled that a generally applicable law requiring
payment of social security taxes does not interfere with the Free Exercise rights of
the Amish who believe that there “is a religiously based obligation to provide for
their fellow members the kind of assistance contemplated by the social security
system.”200 The Court further stated, “[t]he state may justify a limitation on religious
liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental
interest.”201 While recognizing a burden on the Amish faith, the Court found that the
tax was a permissible burden as there was an overriding governmental concern in
serving the public interest by having a well-run social security system.202
Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
But what if a state law were to be equally detrimental to all religions? This Note addresses
that question but because it is so rare for a government to blatantly target citizens based on
their religious beliefs, there is relatively little Supreme Court case law on the subject. 6
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 21.6(a) (4th ed. 2008).
194 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 193, § 21.6(a).
195 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993);
see, e.g., Smith II, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES,
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 503 (4th ed. 2008).
196 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 193, § 21.6(b).
197 Smith II, 494 U.S. 872.
198 Id. at 878–82.
199 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
200 Id. at 252–53, 257.
201 Id. at 257–58.
202 Id. at 257–59. While the Court has stated that laws of general applicability are not
entitled to strict scrutiny, it is important to remember that many states have adopted statutes
similar to the federal RFRA that requires strict scrutiny for any law that substantially burdens
religious freedom. See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
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A direct burden makes it impossible for a religious person to both follow the law
and maintain his or her religious beliefs.203 For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,204
a case involving the Amish challenge of a compulsory school attendance law, the
Court held that “only those interests of the highest order . . . can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”205 In Yoder, “[t]he impact of the
compulsory-attendance law on respondents’ practice of the Amish religion is not
only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them,
under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with funda-
mental tenets of their religious beliefs.”206
When considering the value of the Yoder decision, it is important to remember
that Justice Scalia attempted to differentiate the earlier Yoder case from Smith II by
noting that Yoder is a hybrid case involving both the Free Exercise Clause and the
constitutional right of parents “to direct the education of their children.”207 Some
commentators believe that Smith II effectively overruled Yoder and have mentioned
that Yoder may “create only a very limited exemption from compulsory attendance
laws for families who can base their claim for an exemption on shared religious beliefs
as well as on a general due process–liberty argument.”208 Professor Daniel Conkle
and other commentators conclude that post–Smith II, free exercise protection is only
warranted in cases like Lukumi Babalu, where prejudiced burdens deliberately dis-
criminate against religion.209 However, it could easily be argued that anti-religion
laws by their very nature discriminate against the religious and are thus entitled to
strict scrutiny protection as laid out in Lukumi Babalu.210
A federal court could conclude that a law directly preventing a court from con-
sidering a person’s religious wishes would impose a direct burden on that person’s
ability to freely practice his or her religion. A law banning judges from considering
religious law could interfere with a Muslim’s right to have his will probated accord-
ing to his religious desires or an Orthodox Jew’s ability to obtain a required “get”
during divorce proceedings.211 Unlike the governmental goals of keeping drugs out
of the workplace212 or assuring that the social security system continues to thrive,213
states will be hard-pressed to come up with rational and neutral reasons for not even
allowing state court judges to “consider” religious law when making their decisions.
Generally applicable laws will not always result in automatic constitutionality, and
203 See CONKLE, supra note 153, at 87.
204 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
205 Id. at 215.
206 Id. at 218.
207 Smith II, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
208 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 193, § 21.8(c).
209 See CONKLE, supra note 153, at 94.
210 See supra Part III.A.1.
211 See supra notes 24, 36 and accompanying text.
212 Smith II, 494 U.S. at 905 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
213 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–59 (1982).
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are more likely to be found unconstitutional when they present a direct burden to a re-
ligious adherent. There is no question that an anti-religion law would make it difficult
for a religious person to ensure that their religious preferences (which do not conflict
with public policy) are enforced by a court, suggesting that a court would be required
to strike down an anti-religion law in order to comport with the First Amendment.
Using the Yoder line of reasoning, a court could easily strike down an anti-
religion law. For example, as noted by the plaintiff in Awad v. Ziriax,214 failure by
the court to consider Sharia law when implementing his last will and testament bur-
dens the exercise of his religion because Islam has strict standards for how a deceased
person’s estate should be divided and distributed to friends and family.215 Recognizing
that a law prohibiting courts from considering religious doctrine would burden re-
ligious people, a court would need to balance this burden against the interests of the
state. Taking Pennsylvania as an example, as the interests of the state seem to be based
on pure animosity and prejudice toward Islam,216 it seems fairly clear-cut that the bal-
ancing test would tip in favor of preserving the rights of the religious to have their
beliefs (which do not interfere with state policy) enforced by state courts.
3. Secular Laws
Perhaps the most important and obvious holdings that must be examined to
determine the legitimacy of anti-religious laws are the Court’s limited cases dealing
with issues of secularism. The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that “the State may
not establish a ‘religion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or
showing hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe.’”217 In Zorach v. Clauson,218 the Court ruled that the govern-
ment could not “prefer[ ] those who believe in no religion over those who do be-
lieve” and that there is “no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for
government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen
the effective scope of religious influence.”219 This holding has been reaffirmed over
the succeeding decades since the Zorach decision.220
214 Complaint Seeking a Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction at 6–8,
Awad v. Ziriax, No. CIV-10-1186-M (W.D. Okla. Nov. 4, 2010).
215 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
216 Although some state representatives suggest otherwise. See, e.g., Memorandum from
State Representative RoseMarie Swanger, supra note 140.
217 See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (quoting
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
218 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
219 Id. at 314.
220 See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 103–04 (1968) (holding that “[t]he First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality
between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion”).
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Those in support of anti-religion laws will likely say that, because the law bans
all consideration of religious law,221 the law is inherently neutral and thus a valid ex-
ercise of government authority. While it is true that the proposed anti-religious laws
harm all religious practitioners equally and the proposed laws do not pose any obvi-
ous harm to the non-religious, the anti-religion laws show state favoritism for the non-
religious, thus violating the First Amendment. Ironically, many of those who have
proposed anti-Sharia and anti-religion laws are among the most religious of American
legislators.222 While it may not have been the intent of anti-Islamist drafters like David
Yerushalmi, laws that prohibit state court judges from considering religious law un-
constitutionally favor “those who believe in no religion over those who do believe,”
creating a classic clear-cut violation of the Free Exercise Clause.223
B. The Establishment Clause224
We must also briefly examine anti-religion laws in light of the Establishment
Clause. The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause prohibits the government from
officially endorsing any particular religion.225 However, the government is not required
to ignore the importance and prevalence of religion in America.226 In fact, the Supreme
Court has said that a state court can apply “neutral principles of law” to religious dis-
putes227 by using secular law to address issues between parties who invoke religious
principles in the courtroom.228 The Clause has also been interpreted as the basis for the
principle that the government may not inhibit or interfere with any particular religion.229
221 See, e.g., supra notes 136–46 and accompanying text.
222 For example, the chief architect of the Oklahoma bill, State Senator Rex Duncan, re-
peatedly emphasized the historical importance of Judeo-Christian values during the campaign
to adopt State Question 755. See, e.g., CAIRtv, Cair Video: SQ 755 Sponsor Explains Purpose
of Amendment on MSNBC, supra note 92.
223 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (citing Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
224 Unlike the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause has never been utilized to
strike down a law “inhibiting religion” like the anti-religion laws at issue here, despite the
fact that the Court has noted that the Establishment Clause prevents the inhibition of religion.
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222–24 (1997); see CONKLE, supra note 153, at 87.
225 See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (holding that a public school could not be required
to begin the school day by reading Bible passages).
226 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010) (noting that “[t]he Constitution does
not oblige government to avoid any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in society.”).
For example, “[o]ur coins bear the phrase, ‘In God We Trust.’ The pledge of allegiance to
the flag includes the phrase, ‘One Nation Under God.’ The sessions of [Congress] begin with
an invocation given by a chaplain.” BARRON & DIENES, supra note 195, at 477.
227 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
228 Brian Sites, Religious Documents and the Establishment Clause, 42 U. MEM. L. REV.
1, 13–14 (2011).
229 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
532 (1993).
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This latter principle was the issue at hand in Awad v. Ziriax; it concerned laws that
prevent state court judges from considering any religious law.230 According to the “En-
dorsement Test” proposed by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in a 1984 concurring
opinion, the Establishment Clause “prohibits government from making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.”231 Jus-
tice O’Connor wrote that disapproval of a given religion sends the message to adherents
of that religion “that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community.”232
The “Endorsement Test” should be considered in conjunction with the Lemon
test.233 According to the Lemon test, in order to comport with the Establishment Clause,
a government-sponsored message or statute: 1) “must have a secular legislative pur-
pose”; 2) must have as “its principal or primary effect” a goal that “neither advances
nor inhibits religion”; and 3) “the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government
entanglement with religion.’”234 Lower courts frequently look to the Lemon test when
faced with allegations of Establishment Clause violations.235
What does the Lemon test’s first prong, requiring a “secular legislative purpose,”
actually mean, and how is it applied? The Supreme Court has ruled on this prong in
just a few rare cases.236 For example, the Court has found that there was no valid non-
religious purpose to an Arkansas law that banned the teaching of evolution in public
schools237 and that no “secular legislative purpose” existed for a Kentucky law re-
quiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in school classrooms.238 To deter-
mine the legislative purpose of a given statute, a court must inquire into the state’s
goals when adopting a given policy.239 The second prong of the Lemon test, requiring
that a law not advance or inhibit religion, is fairly self-explanatory.
Moving to the third prong of the Lemon test, the Court described the prevention
of “excessive government entanglement with religion” as an effort to ensure that the
government does not intrude into the domain of religion, and that religion does not
interfere with the operation of the government.240 The Court recognizes that it is not
practical to erect an iron fence between Church and State241 and that the relationship
230 See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305–06 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d, 670 F.3d
1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
231 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
232 Id. at 688.
233 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (setting out a three-pronged test to detect
unconstitutional government action).
234 Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
235 See, e.g., Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the Objective
Observer’s Eyes: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
417, 443 (2006).
236 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 95 (2002).
237 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107–09 (1968).
238 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
239 See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
240 See, e.g., id. at 613–14.
241 Id. at 614.
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between the two “is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship.”242 Furthermore, one of the primary goals
of the Establishment Clause is the prevention of “active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity.”243 The Supreme Court reviewed the “entanglement” prong in
Agostini v. Felton244 and reiterated that an entanglement can result in both the pro-
motion and inhibition of religious practice.245 Perhaps most importantly to our anal-
ysis here, the Court has ruled that “political divisiveness” is a major risk of excessive
government entanglement in religion.246
Establishing no consideration of religious law as the preference for state courts
seems to be a violation of the Establishment Clause. Firstly, proposed anti-religion
laws would likely fail the “Endorsement Test” as the law results in an official govern-
ment “disapproval of religion.”247 Anti-religion laws would also likely fail the Lemon
test. In many states, the laws would fail the “secular legislative purpose” prong be-
cause the actual goal of many of these laws is to prohibit the practice of religion.248
In states like Pennsylvania, where clear legislative intent exists suggesting that a
specific religion (Islam) is the target of legislation,249 the “secular” prong will likely
fail. Again, while the states where anti-religious laws have been proposed will prof-
fer reasons such as threats to state sovereignty,250 media reports and public state-
ments make it fairly obvious that this is nothing but smoke and mirrors to detract
from the legislation’s real goal of inhibiting religious practice, specifically the prac-
tice of Islam.251 The proposed laws by their very nature fail the second prong as their
goal is to inhibit the passive aid of the courts in freely practicing one’s religion.252
The third “excessive entanglement” prong of the Lemon test suggests that an
anti-religion law is unconstitutional but state consideration of religious law is not
unconstitutional. An anti-religion law would likely be viewed as an “active involve-
ment of the sovereign in religious activity”253 because the state government would
serve as a direct impediment to adherents’ religious practice. At the same time, a
court would likely find that there is merely passive governmental involvement when
a state court ensures that a contract or will is enforced in accordance with a person’s
religious principles. Finally, as this Note makes clear, the political divisiveness of
the proposed anti-Sharia and anti-religion laws would contribute to a court’s likely
finding that anti-religion laws violate the Establishment Clause.
242 Id.
243 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
244 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
245 Id. at 233.
246 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 416 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
247 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
248 See supra notes 136–46 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 137–40 and accompanying text.
250 See, e.g., Memorandum from State Representative RoseMarie Swanger, supra note 140.
251 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
252 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1974).
253 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
2012] THE ONLY THING WE HAVE TO FEAR IS FEAR ITSELF 301
One could argue that the Establishment Clause actually requires that state courts
not consider any type of religious law. The Supreme Court has ruled that the gov-
ernment cannot coerce a person into religious participation.254 In Lee v. Weisman,255
the Court stated that “the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”256 In Weisman, the Court
ruled that non-denominational prayer at a public high school graduation ceremony
was a violation of the Establishment Clause because it placed “public pressure” to
stand and remain silent while others practiced their religious beliefs.257 The Court was
concerned that a non-religious student may have felt that he or she was being forced
to participate in a religion, or religion in general, that he or she did not endorse.258
If state courts were required to consider religious laws, one could imagine a
scenario during a jury trial where a non-religious juror would be required to consider,
and potentially even apply, religious principles during deliberations. For example, if
a jury was required to consider a business contract governed by Islamic law, a jury
member could be forced to consider Sharia law during deliberations in an attempt to
determine the meaning of the contract and the intentions of the parties. The mere in-
clusion of the juror in the jury and the public reading of a verdict might violate a juror’s
right to not embrace any type of religion because his or her participation in the “group
exercise . . . [could] signif[y] her own participation or approval of [religion or
Islam].”259 These concerns could potentially be belied through jury voir dire questions,
although these questions in and of themselves could create First Amendment issues.
CONCLUSION
Will Islam ever be fully accepted in America? One law professor, John Witte Jr.,
suggests that Muslims must essentially wait their turn.260 In a recent speech he noted
that, “[t]he current accommodations made to the religious legal systems of Christians,
Jews, First Peoples and others in the West were not born overnight. They came only
after centuries of sometimes hard and cruel experience, with gradual adjustments and
accommodations on both sides.”261 He argues that Muslims must fight for their rights,
much like Jews who have only recently acquired legal rights for “Sabbath accommo-
dations and access to kosher food” and most relevant to recent anti-Sharia provisions,
“the option to have Jewish courts decide certain domestic and financial affairs.”262
254 See Sites, supra note 228, at 10–11.
255 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
256 Id. at 587. For another “coercion” case, see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290 (2000) (holding that student-led prayer prior to a public high school athletic event vio-
lated the Establishment Clause).
257 Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 See Loftus, supra note 14.
261 Id.
262 Id.
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If courts are to consider religious law in their decision-making process, how
should they do it? One scholar believes that the standards laid out by Supreme Court
precedent require that courts not resolve doctrinal disputes; “not inquire . . . into
religious doctrine or polity”; defer to religious tribunals; and most importantly
“apply traditional neutral principles of law to resolve disputes involving interpre-
tation of religious documents.”263
I was originally inspired to write this Note due to my mere shock at the exis-
tence of Oklahoma’s anti-Sharia provision, a voter-approved law based on fear and
bigotry, designed to combat a non-existent problem.264 As the Tenth Circuit made
abundantly clear, laws that target specific religions are facial violations of the First
Amendment.265 Furthermore, as this Note has shown, more generalized laws de-
signed to prevent state court consideration of any religious law will likely be found
to be unconstitutional violations of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of
the First Amendment.266
Religious persecution is not a new phenomenon in America, and history sug-
gests that the passage of time generally leads to acceptance.267 There is hope that
the anti-Islam movement is beginning to ebb. Around the tenth anniversary of the
September 11 attacks, polls showed that approximately thirty percent of Americans
believed that Muslims intended to make Sharia law the supreme “law of the land,”268
but a more recent poll states that this view is now only held by fourteen percent of
Americans, and over two-thirds of Americans disagree with the notion.269 By mid-
2012, multiple anti-Sharia bills failed or were pulled by their authors.270 One can
only hope that the Muslim community in the United States will one day soon be
fully appreciated and welcomed into the American melting pot.271
263 Sites, supra note 228, at 19.
264 See supra Part I.D.
265 See supra Part II
266 See supra Part III.
267 See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text.
268 PUB. RELIGION RESEARCH INST., SURVEY, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AMERICAN:
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NO COST (2012), http://publicreligion.org/research/2012/02/january-tracking-poll-2012/.
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271 To learn more about Islam and Sharia in an attempt to combat and educate others about
American Islamophobia, see DEFENDING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM UNDERSTANDING SHARIAH,
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